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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellees (Armstrongs) concur with Appellant (Pickett) that
this court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Anno. 78-2-2(3) and Utah Const. Art VIII, §§ 1 and 3.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Armstrongs concur that Pickett has raised the five issues
stated in his brief.
additional issues.

Armstrongs ask the court to address two

They are, 1) whether Pickett properly

preserved his issues before the trial court, and 2) whether
opposing counsel may proceed on behalf of Pickett without showing
authority to do so.

Because both of these issues were raised

before this court this court will be the only court to determine
whether the Armstrongs assertions are correct.

The standard this

court should use in considering these issues is "correctness,"
State

v. Pena,

869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), i.e. is Armstrongs'

position on these issues correct.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
41-12a-304. No-fault tort immunity ineffective.
The owner of a motor vehicle on which owner's or
operatorfs security is required under Section
41-12a-301 who fails to have the security in effect at
the time of an accident does not have immunity from
tort liability under Subsection 31A-22-309(1). This
owner is personally liable for the payment of the
benefits provided for under Section 31A-22-307 to
persons entitled to receive them under Section
31A-22-308.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a negligence claim.

Pickett ran a stop sign while

intoxicated, injured the Armstrongs and totaled their vehicle.
They sued to recover their damages.
Course of Proceedings
After Armstrongs filed suit they were unable to locate
Pickett and obtained an order from the court allowing service by
mail.

Counsel answered for Pickett.

When Pickett refused to

appear for his deposition Armstrongs filed a motion to compel and
then a motion for sanctions.

Each was granted.

As a result of

the motion for sanctions Pickett's pleadings were stricken.
matter was then tried to the court on damages.

The

Armstrongs were

awarded judgments for their personal injuries and property
damage.

Pickett appealed.
Disposition at Trial Court

The matter was tried to the court on damages.

The trial

court awarded special, general and punitive damages.

Pickett

objected to some proposed findings of fact in general but not
with specific citations to the exhibits, the transcript or the
law.

Those objections were not noticed for consideration by the

trial court and the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment proposed by Armstrongs were entered.
2

RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
On January 7, 1996 Pickett, driving his Chevrolet Suburban,
struck the Armstrongs' Suburban. (Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp
no. 1, 4). Pickett was arrested and charged with driving under
the influence.

(Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp no. 5, 14). At

the scene of the collision Pickett could not stand, even with the
help of witnesses.

(Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp no. 8).

Pickett's blood alcohol was between .12 and .14.

(Record at 578,

page/line 26/19) .
At the time of the Pickett collision Dan Armstrong was 41.
(Appendix at Tab a, bate stamp no. 1). In the collision Dan
Armstrong was struck in the lower back. (Record at 578, page/line
3 0/22-24) . Dan Armstrong had suffered an injury to his back in a
prior motor vehicle accident. (Record at 578, page/line 31/2532/2).

The injury to his back was exacerbated by the collision

at issue in this case. As a result of the prior injury Dan
usually woke up between 3:30 a.m. to 4:00 a.m.

After the Pickett

collision he woke up at 2:00 a.m, the pain lasted longer and was
more frequent.

(Record at 578, page/line 31/17).

Before the

Pickett collision Dan need to exercise 2-3 times a week to
resolve the pain in his back. (Record at 578, page/line 32/15).
Since the Pickett collision Dan has to do the exercises everyday
and his back still flares up.

(Record at 578, page/line 33/18).
3

Further, Dan now has to do additional exercises to keep the pain
in his back under control.

(Record at 578, page/line 34/6).

If

Dan doesn't do the exercises he has severe pain which he
attributes to the accident.

(Record at 578, page/line 34/17).

Since the Pickett collision Mr. Armstrong has to get up and move
around after sitting for one and a half to two hours.

He didn't

have to get up and move around before the Pickett collision.
(Record at 578, page/line 35/12).

Over all Dan can't do the

things he does as well as he did before the collision.

(Record

at 578, page/line 35/18) . Mr. Armstrong was referred for an MRI
by his family physician, Scott Smith, for complaints of lower
back pain.

That scan was performed November 18, 1997.

(Appendix

at Tab D, bate stamp no. 104; Tab E, bate stamp no. 110). As a
result of his back problems his chiropractor recommended that Dan
get an orthopedic chair.

(Appendix at exhibit 5.)

Dan's total

medical expenses arising from the Pickett collision were at least
$3823.00.

(Appendix at exhibit 3 ) .

At the time of the Pickett collision Jared Armstrong was 15.
(Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp no. 1 ) . In the collision Jared
Armstrong's face was cut.

(Record at 578, page/line 31/3).

Jared underwent plastic surgery in an attempt to remove those
scars.

(Appendix at Tab F, bate stamp no. 135-140, 180-185).

photograph of Jared's scars, after the surgery, was admitted at
4

A

trial and shows that they remain. (Appendix at Tab F, bate stamp
no. 148). Jared's scars are noticed by other people.

(Record at

578, page/line 73/18) . Jared incurred medical expenses of at
least $2778.78 as a result of the Pickett collision.

(Appendix

at exhibit 4).
At the time of the Pickett collision Taylor Armstrong was 6.
(Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp no. 1). In the collision Taylor
struck his head and lost consciousness.

(Appendix at Tab H, bate

stamp no. 217, 222). After the collision Taylor's parents became
concerned about him.
accident.

Taylor used to run but didn't after the

He forgot his "ABCs" and reading became a chore.

(Record at 578, page/line 36/14). Taylor's parents noticed that
his eye-hand coordination was off and that Taylor had to think
about running. (Record at 578, page/line 37/21).
trouble kicking and throwing a ball.

He also has

(Record at 578, page/line

3 8/12) . The Armstrongs have had to work constantly with Taylor on
his reading.

They read with him in the morning before he goes to

school to "get him started".
Taylor has seven siblings.

(Record at 578, page/line 37/1).
(Record at 578, page/line 66/7).

His

parents have been involved in the education of all their children
but they have to work a lot harder with Taylor.

(Record at 578,

page/line 66/17) . Taylor is behind his siblings in school work.
(Record at 578, page/line 37/15). He has to work a lot harder
5

than his siblings do at school work.
66/17).

(Record at 578, page/line

In July of 1999 the Armstrong's consulted Dr. Erin

Bigler, a neuropsychologist.

(Record at 578, page/line 57/23).

Dr. Bigler tested and examined Taylor on June 27th and July
9th of 1999.

(Appendix at Tab M, bate stamp no. 470). Dr.

Bigler testified that a positive loss of consciousness, like that
Taylor sustained, is definitive for brain injury.
578, page/line 78/11).

(Record at

Forgetting one's ABCs is a common

difficulty in children with brain injury. (Record at 578,
page/line 78/19). Continuing to experience problems three and one
half half years after the accident indicates there are residual
effects of the head injury.

(Record at 578, page/line 79/6).

The tests indicate Taylor suffers a left hemisphere brain injury
which effects his language.

(Record at 578, page/line 70/10).

Taylor's verbal IQ was 89 but his performance IQ was 108, a 19
point difference which is beyond the standard deviation and
statistically different than what you would expect to see.
(Record at 578, page/line 79/20).

The statistical difference in

conjunction with the testing performance suggests the left
hemisphere brain injury. (Record at 578, page/line 80/6).

Taylor

took the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test and scored considerably
above average.

This with the other tests show that Taylor's

problem is with reading, spelling & verbal analytical processing
6

and not visual verbal processing.
81/8).

(Record at 578, page/line

Taylor also took the Wide Range Achievement Test which

showed that Taylor is behind in reading and spelling.
578, page/line 81/24).

(Record at

The result is that Taylor has a

difference in his visual memory and verbal memory. (Record at
578, page/line 82/4).

Dr. Bigler's opinion is that Taylor

suffered a verbal learning loss as a consequence of the head
injury.

There may be permanency to the deficit and he may not

get back to the previous potential. (Record at 578, page/line
82/18).

If the problems persist he will not be successful in

college and likely will not be able to pursue a variety of
technical jobs in positions which will require complex verbal
processing, reading, spelling, critical writing.

The injury will

dictate the kinds of jobs he can pursue. (Record at 578,
page/line 82/25).

It is more probable than not that Taylor's

problems will continue. (Record at 578, page/line 83/10).
People with Taylor's problems experience a higher frequency
of neuropsychiatric problems like depression, heightened anxiety,
and stress disorders.

(Record at 578, page/line 83/19).

There

is also an increased risk for learning disabilities and learning
problems. People with problems like Taylor's also have a tendency
to be more impulsive, have problems with judgment & ability to
sustain attention and concentration. (Record at 578, page/line
7

84/1).

The testing showed problems verbal abilities.

Reading,

spelling vocabulary use and verbal comprehension were all down
from his high average to superior rating in non-verbal abilities
(Record at 578, page/line 84/24).

Because of the problems

associated with his injury Taylor will probably earn less income
over his life than he would have had he not been injured.
(Record at 578, page/line 85/16). Taylor may work around some of
the problems but he will still not compete on a level with his
peers.

(Record at 578, page/line 85/17).

Taylor's injury is,

more probably than not, a permanent impairment. (Record at 578,
page/line 86/1).

The fact that he can compensate doesn't mean

Taylor is not impaired.

(Record at 578, page/line 86/2).

Taylor's injury is a classic minor traumatic brain injury.

You

can have minor problems with monumental difficulties. (Record at
578, page/line 86/19).

People like Taylor may get somewhat

better, they usually do and then have an absolute leveling off
where a plateau is reached which is insurmountable thereafter.
(Record at 578, page/line 89/2). Taylor's medical expenses
associated with the Pickett collision were at least $7147.83.
(Appendix, exhibit five).
As a result of the collision the Armstrong vehicle, a 1992
Suburban, was a total loss. (Appendix at Tab J, bate stamp no.
2 74). Pickett claims that Armstrongs may not recover for this
8

loss because that claim was asserted by Dan Armstrong though the
vehicle was titled to his wife, Appellant Lorene Armstrong.

In

fact Pickett's insurance company had already paid Appellant Dan
Armstrong, on behalf of Pickett, part of the value of the vehicle
by a check made payable to Dan Armstrong. (Appendix at Tab J,
bate stamp no. 274). The other evidence pertaining to the
vehicle showed that it was Dan Armstrong who paid for the add on
items which increased the value of the vehicle and which were
also lost in the collision.

(Appendix at Tab J, bate stamp no.

286 and at Tab X ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This matter was tried to the trial court. Appellate courts
grant trial courts substantial discretion in such matters.
Though Pickett objected to numerous proposed findings of fact
those objections were not submitted for decision so the trial
court did not have the opportunity to rule on them.
Once Pickett's pleadings had been stricken and his default
entered Armstrongs were entitled to recover whatever damages the
evidence established.

In particular, Utah's no-fault automobile

insurance statute is an affirmative defense which was stricken
with the rest of Pickett's pleadings.

Even if the court finds

that the no-fault statute is not an affirmative defense there is
sufficient evidence to support the judgment based upon the
9

injuries suffered by each of the Armstrongs.
ARGUMENT
I
THE APPELLATE STANDARD ON EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
A trial court's evidentiary rulings are subject to an of
discretion standard. Harline
1996).

v.

Barker,

912 P.2d 433, 441 (Utah

Even if a court's evidentiary ruling is in error it will

not be reversed on appeal unless the error is harmful. Jouflas

Fox Television

Stations,

Inc.,

v.

927 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1996).

Harmful error occurs where the likelihood of a different outcome
in the absence of the error is sufficiently high so as to
undermine confidence in the verdict. State v. Knight,
913, 920 (Utah 1987).
clear error.

State

v.

734 P.2d

This standard has also been described as
Gamblin,

2000 UT 44, P17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108.

Applying this standard to the facts of this case this court must
affirm the judgments of the trial court.
II
PICKETT'S POINTS OF ERROR WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL
In his brief Pickett summarily concludes that his points on
appeal were preserved for appeal by citing to various pages in
the record where the issue was supposedly addressed.

Pickett's

terse discussion of these issues does not mean they were properly
preserved for appeal.

At the conclusion of trial proposed
10

findings of fact were submitted for the trial court's
consideration.

Pickett responded with an objection to 18 of

those findings. (Record at 567). The text of that Objection,
comprising a single page, merely listed the numbered paragraphs
to which Pickett objected but provided no factual or legal basis
for the objections.

Further, despite the existence of Rule 4-

504, Utah Code Jud. Admin., which requires Pickett to advise the
clerk to submit the objection to the trial court for
consideration, no Notice to Submit for Decision was submitted.
Pickett's terse objections do not meet the standard Utah
courts require when a party seeks to preserve an issue for
appeal.

Before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the

record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the
trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon."
Salt Lake

County

v.

Carlston,

1989); see also Hart v.

Salt

776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App.
Lake

County

Comm'n,

945 P.2d 125,

129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (II,I!A matter is sufficiently raised if
it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an
opportunity to rule on the issue. 111 ").

Moreover, the party must

specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought "to a
'level of consciousness' before the trial court." Hart, 945 P.2d
at 130 (quoting James

v.

Preston,

746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct.

App. 1987)). This requirement "serves the interests of judicial

11

economy and orderly procedure" by not only giving the trial court
a chance to correct error, but by making the parties "crystallize
issues prior to appeal." State
Currency,

v. Sixteen

Thousand

Dollars

U.S.

914 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). When issues

are not brought to the trial court's attention in a timely
manner, they are "deemed waived, precluding the appellate court
from considering their merits on appeal." Carlston,
655.

776 P.2d at

Pickett's objection to the findings, without allowing the

trial court to consider them, do not meet this standard.
This case is also legally akin to Evans v. State,
177 (Utah 1998).

963 P.2d

There the court cited Rule 4-502(2), Utah Code

Jud. Admin., and held that a party was bound by an order to which
it did not object.

Here Pickett's objections were completely

unsupported and cannot form the basis for preserving issues on
appeal.
Each of the points Pickett asserts on appeal was addressed
in one of his Objections to Armstrong's Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. (Record at 567). Pickett's issue one is
whether Dan Armstrong may recover for damage to his vehicle which
happened to be titled in his wife's name.

That factual issue is

contained in the Findings at paragraph 11, record at 552,
objected to by Pickett, without background or support. (Record at
567) .
12

Pickett's issue two is whether Dan Armstrong and Jared
Armstrong may recover for damages which Pickett claims do not
meet the no-fault threshold. That factual issue is implicit in
the Findings at paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 10, 25, 44, 44, and 45,
record at 552-556, objected to by Pickett, without background or
support. (Record at 567).
Pickett's issue three is whether Dan Armstrong's prior back
injury was aggravated by the collision. That factual issue is
contained in the Findings at paragraph 5, record at 552. It was
objected to by Pickett, without background or support. (Record at
567) .
Pickett's issue four is whether the scaring of Jared
Armstrong is permanent, allowing him to recover in the face of
Utah's no-fault statute.

That factual issue is contained in the

Findings at paragraphs 25 and 45, record at 554 and 556.

It

was objected to by Pickett, without background or support.
(Record at 567).
Pickett's issue five is whether the closed head brain injury
suffered by Taylor Armstrong supports the damages the trial court
awarded.

That factual issue is contained in the Findings at

paragraph 25-27, 30, 37, 39, 42, 43, and 46, record at 554-556,
objected to by Pickett, without background or support. (Record at
567) .
13

While Pickett may have discussed these issues tangentially
at times during the trial nothing in the record indicates they
were adequately presented so as to be brought "to a 'level of
consciousness1 before the trial court." Hart,

945 P.2d at 130.

Between the court's file, the transcript of the trial and the
exhibits the record in this matter approaches 1500 pages.
Pickett's brief comments are not sufficient to preserve the
issues for trial in light of his complete failure to allow the
trial court to focus on them succinctly as it could have had the
objections to the Findings of Fact been supported and noticed.
Ill
PICKETT WAS DEFAULTED AND ARMSTRONGS
WERE ENTITLED TO ALL DAMAGES AWARDED
Pickett argues that Appellants Dan Armstrong and Jared
Armstrong are not entitled to recover because their claims are
barred by no-fault even though Pickett's pleadings, including all
his defenses, were stricken.

They are in error.

Utah law on the effect of a default is long standing.
A default on which a judgment may be rendered is an
admission of every traversable allegation of the
declaration or complaint necessary to plaintiff's cause
of action, also, that defendant is the person named in
the writ and intended to be served, and that the court
has acquired jurisdiction of his person, and has
jurisdiction of the cause of action, and also
constitutes an admission of the due execution of the
instrument sued on. Utah Ass'n

14

of

Credit

Men v.

Bowman,

38 Utah 326, 113 P. 63 (Utah 1911). [emphasis added]
Pickett was entitled to, and did, plead a defense derived
from Utah's no-fault automobile insurance statute.

That defense,

along with all others, was stricken when the court entered its
order striking his pleadings for his failure to participate in
discovery.
Pickett correctly quotes Utah Code Anno. 31A-22-309(1)(a)(e).

However Pickett has ignored that section's companion

provision of the code.
u

Utah Code Anno. 41-12a-304 provides,

[t]he owner of a motor vehicle on which owner's or operator's

security is required under Section 41-12a-301 who fails to have
the security in effect at the time of an accident does not have
immunity from tort liability under Subsection 31A-22-309(1)."
This court has previously held that this language literally means
what it says.

See Allstate

Ins.

Co. v.

Ivie,

606 P.2d 1197, 1200

(Utah 1980).
The result si that Pickett could fall into one of two
groups.

He could be properly insured and have tort immunity or

he could be uninsured and not have immunity.

That status, and

the immunity associated with it, constituted an affirmative
defense which was pled but was lost when Pickett's pleadings were
stricken.

Had Pickett appeared pro se or with counsel who had

failed to plead the no-fault defense Armstrongs would have been
15

allowed to obtain judgment for all damages they sustained.

After

Pickett's pleadings were stricken he was in exactly that
position.
Pickett argues that holding that his insured status is an
affirmative defense rather than jurisdictional and will in some
fashion open the flood gates of unsanctioned litigation.
argument rings hollow.

That

Those who have insurance and are sued

know to take claims asserted against them to their insurance
adjustors for defense by their carrier's hired counsel, like
Pickett did.

It is only the irresponsible who fail to maintain

insurance, or who fail to participate in discovery, who should
have any concern.

The fact that this is a case of first

impression shows there is no reasonable concern.
This, and other courts, have held that similar sorts of
statutory defenses are affirmative defenses.
States,

Ingraham

v.

United

808 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1987) (the statutory cap on

medical malpractice damages was an affirmative defense which was
waived when not pled); Brannan

v.

United

Studen

Aid

Funds,

Inc.,

94 F.3rd 1260 (9th Cir. 1996) (the government actor exemption to
the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act was an affirmative
defense which was waived when not pled); Freeman v. Chevron
Co.,

Oil

517 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1975) (workers compensation was an

affirmative defense which was waived when not pled); Pitts
16

v.

Pine Mountain

Ranch,

Inc.,

589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978) (Utah Code

Anno. 78-13-1(1) specifying jurisdiction for real property
actions could not be raised after default was taken).
Pickett's no-fault defense was an affirmative defense.
he was defaulted that defense was stricken.

Once

Any evidence as to

that defense was evidence as to liability and not as to damages
and was appropriately not considered by the trial court.

IY
PICKETT STIPULATED TO THE EVIDENCE
At the beginning of the trial of this matter the parties
presented the court a book of exhibits which they had previously
complied and which they stipulated would be admitted and used by
the court in trying the damages issues.
23).

(Record at pages 22 and

The trial court accepted that stipulation and used the

exhibits in issuing its findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment. In Utah evidence which is otherwise not admissible may
be admitted and considered if the parties stipulate to its
admission.

State

v. Abel,

v. Collins,

612 P.2d 775 (Utah, 1980); State

600 P.2d 994, 998 (Utah, 1979);

1232 (Utah, 1974); State v. Rowley,

v. Jenkins,

State

523 P.2d

15 Utah 2d 4, 386 P.2d 126

(1963) . Because Pickett stipulated to the admission of the
exhibit book the court was entitled to consider all the evidence
contained in the book.
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V
PICKETT HAS NOT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings, an
appellant must first marshal all the evidence that supports the
trial court's findings.

After marshaling the supporting

evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's
findings." State v.
re Pendleton,

Gamblin,

2000 UT 44, P17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108; In

2000 UT 77, 11 P.3d 284, note 6.

Pickett lists a few of the facts supporting the judgment and
then argues they were insufficient.

Armstrongs invite the court

to compare Pickett's Addendum, small excerpts of the evidence at
trial, to theirs, all the evidence considered below. Pickett asks
this court to look at the facts that supports his position and
reweigh the evidence on that basis. Pickett's exercise before
this court fails for the reason described by this court at note 6
of Child

v. Gonda,

972 P.2d 425 (Utah 1998)

[I]f nine eyewitnesses testify that the stop light was
red and one eyewitness testifies that it was green, the
jury may choose to believe the one eyewitness. The fact
that the jury chose to believe the one instead of the
nine is not enough to establish that the verdict was
"'completely lacking or so slight and unconvincing as
to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.
The trial court is entitled to the same deference.
18

Pickett's efforts to marshal the evidence in this matter
fail in that they, by themselves, show that there is sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's findings and therefore the
judgments.

When the evidence Pickett omitted is added it is

clear that the trial court's determination must be upheld.
VI
ARMSTRONGS MET THE NO- FAULT THRESHOLD
Notwithstanding the fact that Appellants Dan and Jared
Armstrong did not need to meet the no-fault threshold because
Pickett's pleadings had been stricken they met the threshold
nonetheless.
A
JARED ARMSTRONG'S SCARS
1
THE SCARS ARE DISFIGURING
Pickett argues that Jared Armstrong's scars are not
sufficiently disfiguring to meet the no-fault threshold set by
Utah Code Anno. 31A-22-309(1)(d). Pickett does cite a standard
for determining which scars are disfiguring and which are not.
Black's Law Dictionary defines disfigurement as "an impairment or
injury to the appearance of a person or thing."
1999).

480 (7th ed.

Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary defines

disfigurement as, "2. anything that disfigures or defaces;
19

blemish; defect; deformity." [emphasis added] Jared and his
mother both described the scars as disfiguring.
The evidence at trial, on the scars, was as follows.
collision Jared Armstrong's face was cut.
page/line 31/3) .

(Record at 578,

Jared underwent plastic surgery in an attempt

to remove those scars.
140, 180-185).

In the

(Appendix at Tab F, bate stamp no. 135-

A photograph of Jared's scars, after the surgery,

was admitted at trial and shows that they remain. (Appendix at
Tab F, bate stamp no. 148). Jared's scars are noticed by other
people.

(Record at 578, page/line 73/18).

The scars clearly

disfigure and meet the no-fault threshold.
2

PICKETT ACKNOWLEDGED AT TRIAL THAT THE SCARS MET THE THRESHOLD
In his opening statement at trial Pickett did not take the
position that Jared's scars did not meet the no-fault threshold.
Instead, at trial, (Record at 578, page/line 12/12), Pickett's
counsel discussed Jared's scars with the court.

There he said

"That the two boys, that this claim, I guess there's a question
on whether or not Taylor has a permanent impairment, permanent
injury, but they both received scarring and under the threshold
requirements a permanent disfigurement is, I guess, then through
the threshold."
Further during colloquy with the court on the no-fault issue
20

counsel again did not argue that Jared's scars did not meet the
no-fault threshold.

At that point he only made that argument as

to Dan's injuries.

(Record at 578, page/line 16/11).

Rather

than tell the court that Jared's scars were not permanently
disfiguring within the purview of the code he acknowledged that
they were.
Later in closing argument Pickett could have raised the nofault defense but did not.

There, rather than argue that Jared's

injuries were not sufficiently serious to meet the no-fault
threshold Pickett merely argued that Jared could not recover the
sums which had already been paid by PIP.

n

We don't dispute that

Jared's medical expenses were $2,778.78. That amount, however,
was all paid for by the PIP carrier that we discussed earlier.
We don't believe he's entitled to recover those amounts again in
this action."

(Record at 578, page/line

96/14-18).

Before the trial court Pickett did not argue that Jared's
scars did not meet the no-fault threshold.

He cannot raise the

failure to meet the threshold argument now.

1
DAN ARMSTRONGS INJURIES ARE PERMANENT
The evidence at trial on Dan Armstrong's injuries was as
follows.
back.

In the collision Dan Armstrong was struck in the lower

(Record at 578, page/line 30/22-24) . Mr. Armstrong had
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suffered an injury to his back in a prior motor vehicle accident.
(Record at 578, page/line 31/25-32/2).

The prior damage to his

back was exacerbated by the collision at issue in this case.

As

a result of the prior injury Dan awoke at 3:30 a.m. to 4:00 a.m.
After the Pickett collision he started to wake up at 2:00 a.m.
The pain lasted longer and was more frequent.
page/line 31/17) .

(Record at 578,

Before the Pickett collision Dan need to

exercise 2-3 times a week to resolve the pain in his back.
(Record at 578, page/line 32/15) . After the Pickett collision he
has to do the exercises everyday and his back still flares up.
(Record at 578, page/line 33/18) .

Further, he now has to do

additional exercises to keep the pain under control.
578, page/line 34/6).

If he doesn't do the exercises he has

severe pain which he attributes to the accident.
page/line 34/17).

(Record at

(Record at 578,

At work Mr. Armstrong has to get up and move

around after sitting for one and a half to two hours.

He didn't

have to get up and move around before the Pickett collision.
(Record at 578, page/line 35/12).

Over all he can't do the

things he does as well as he did before the collision.
at 578, page/line 35/18).

(Record

Mr. Armstrong was referred for an MRI

by his family physician, Scott Smith, for complaints of lower
back pain.

That scan was performed November 18, 1997.

(Appendix

at Tab D, bate stamp no. 104; Tab E, bate stamp no. 110). As a
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result of his back problems his chiropractor recommended that Dan
get an orthopedic chair.

(Appendix at exhibit 5.)

Dan's total

medical expenses arising from the Pickett collision were at least
$3823.00.

(Appendix at exhibit 3 ) .

While Dan Armstrong did not have a physician testify that he
suffered a specific percentage impairment of the whole man as is
often seen in personal injury trials there was nonetheless
objective testimony of his permanent impairment.
held almost four years following the collision.

The trial was
At that time Dan

Armstrong was still experiencing pain and limitation from the
collision.

That is evidence of a permanent impairment.

Pickett argues that Dr. Smith's chart on Dan did not show
any evidence of complaints of back pain arising from the
accident.

However evidence at trial showed that there were

omissions in Dr. Smith's chart.

Dan's medical records showed

that he had been referred by Dr. Smith for an MRI because of pain
in his lower back which had persisted since the collision even
though there was no reference in Dr. Smith's records of that MRI
referral.

The radiology report confirmed damage to Dan's back.

(Appendix at Tab D, bate stamp no.

103) (Record at 578,

page/line 60/24-61/5) . While this may not be as much evidence a
Pickett would have liked it was nonetheless a preponderance in
the trial court's mind.
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VII
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENTS
A
THE TAYLOR ARMSTRONG PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT
Pickett argues that this court should revisit the judgment
awarded Taylor Armstrong.

Armstrongs' version of the facts show

Taylor suffering a significant loss in his verbal abilities as a
result of Pickett's driving while he was drunk.

That means that

not only will Taylor not be able to read for the sake of
enjoyment he will not be able to obtain the more lucrative types
of employment where reading is a central skill. Dr. Bigler's
description was that the injury is the type which has "monumental
consequences./; The trial court obviously believed Armstrongs'
version of the facts.

Having believed that version of the facts

a verdict for $350,000.00 in general damages is not inordinately
high.

It may be low.
B
THE JARED ARMSTRONG PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT

Armstrongs' version of Jared's injuries is that they
embarrass him and they are permanent.

Again, it is apparent the

trial court accepted Armstrongs' version.

The fact that Jared

will be embarassed by those scars for the next 50 years supports
a verdict for $10,000.00 in general damages.
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c
THE DANIEL ARMSTRONG PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT
The Armstrongs' version of Dan's injuries is that they cause
him pain daily and restrict his ability to make a living. Again,
it is apparent the trial court accepted Armstrongs' version.

The

fact that Dan will be called upon to suffer from this collision
for the rest of his life supports a verdict for $10,000.00 in
general damages.
D
THE DANIEL ARMSTRONG PROPERTY JUDGMENT
Pickett argues that the trial court could not award Dan
Armstrong a judgment for damage to the Suburban because he had
put it in his wife's name.

This argument ignores the reality of

modern life and Utah law.

The evidence showed that, even though

the vehicle was titled in Lorene Armstrong's name all of the
receipts for improvements and work on the car were in Dan's name.
Lorene is a party to this suit, acting as the guardian ad litem
for her minor sons.

Pickett's insurance company didn't quibble

about the title when they made a partial payment for the loss.
Utah law provides that Dan has a sufficient interest in the
Suburban to allow him to sue for its loss.
marital property.

The Suburban was

Marital property encompasses all of the assets

of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and
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from whatever source derived. Marsh
973 P.2d 988.

v.

Marsh,

1999 UT App 14 1[l9,

Dan Armstrong suffered a loss when the Suburban

was destroyed whether it was in his name or not.

The trial court

appropriately awarded him a judgment for its loss.
VIII
COUNSEL MUST SHOW PROOF THAT THEY HAVE AUTHORITY TO APPEAR
After this action was filed Armstrongs filed a motion under
Utah Code Anno. 78-51-33 to require counsel to prove that they
had authority to appear on Pickett's behalf.

That motion was

based on the fact that Pickett had failed to appear for his
deposition and at trial.

(Record at 578, page 1 ) . Counsel never

did provide any documentation from Pickett showing authority nor
did they "prove by [their] own oath" that they had that
authority.

Instead they relied upon the fact that they had been

hired by Pickett's insurance company and that was sufficient
authorization.
The fact that Pickett refused to appear for his deposition
or for trial is a clear indication that he did not want to be
involved in this matter further.

Without authorization, counsel

should not be allowed to proceed on his behalf.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in the
trial of this matter.

Each of the trial court's findings of fact
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and conclusions of law are adequately supported by the record.
The judgments awarded are proper.

Pickett is entitled to an

offset for sums previously paid by his insurance company for the
total loss of the Armstrongs' vehicle.

Similarly he is entitled

to an offset for sums paid by the Armstrongs' carrier for PIP as
Armstrongs acknowledged at trial.

This appeal should be

dismissed, the judgments awarded by the trial court affirmed and
the Armstrongs awarded their costs.
Dated this 13th day of December, 2001.

Robert H. Wilde
Attorney for Appellees
ADDENDUM
The Armstrongs' Addendum is bound separately and filed herewith.
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